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Abstract
Personhood is a foundational concept in ethics, yet defining criteria have been elusive. In this article we
summarize attempts to define personhood in psychological and neurological terms and conclude that
none manage to be both specific and non-arbitrary. We propose that this is because the concept does not
correspond to any real category of objects in the world. Rather, it is the product of an evolved brain
system that develops innately and projects itself automatically and irrepressibly onto the world whenever
triggered by stimulus features such as a human-like face, body, or contingent patterns of behavior. We
review the evidence for the existence of an autonomous person network in the brain and discuss its
implications for the field of ethics and for the implicit morality of everyday behavior.
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Response to Open Peer Commentaries
on “Personhood and Neuroscience:
Naturalizing or Nihilating?’’:
Getting Personal
Martha J. Farah and Andrea S. Heberlein, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience,
University of Pennsylvania
Why do we have such strong intuitions that persons—as
opposed to merely humans, thinking things, or sentient
beings—exist? Why can’t we identify the traits that determine personhood, or agree on which entities are persons?
These are the main questions that our Target Article addresses. We suggest that the answer involves innate mechanisms that served us (or our genes) well enough in ancient
times, but which create confusion today. Indeed, we suggest
that the very intuition that there is a category of things in the
world corresponding to persons is confused. Furthermore,
our attempts to identify traits that confer moral standing,
by virtue of personhood, suffer from the influence of our
evolved intuitions on our reasoning about morally relevant
psychological and neurological characteristics.
The first part of our argument is that personhood has
not yet been satisfactorily defined, raising the possibility
that it does not correspond to a real category of things in the
world. Many of the commentators (Banja 2007; Buford and
Allhoff 2007; Churchland 2007; Grey, Hall and Carter 2007;
Nelson 2007; Perring 2007; Sagoff 2007) address this part
of the argument. To summarize their critique (with blithe
disregard of the nuances that distinguish their positions),
they point out that this is nothing new, that indeed most
concepts are fuzzy and/or impossible to define. To this we
have two responses. First, the personhood concept suffers
from more than just fuzziness; its definitional problems run
deeper than the lack of a sharp boundary. Second, the difficulty of defining personhood is only the first half of our
argument; to reconstruct the argument as “personhood resists definition therefore there are no persons” is to get it
wrong.
The problem of defining personhood is more fundamental than a mere lack of necessary and sufficient criteria. We
know that fuzzy boundaries separate mountains and molehills, day and night, etc. The assumption that natural categories have sharp boundaries is a straw man, and it is not
part of our argument—not even the first part of our argument. Simply recognizing that personhood could be a matter of de-

gree does not solve the definitional problems we reviewed. Rosch’s
subjects might disagree on whether a lamp is “furniture,”
but they agree that it belongs between a sofa and a doorknob in its degree of “furnitureness”—a pattern of data that
is a hallmark of fuzzy categories. In contrast, there is no
consensus on the rankings of the “personness” of a patient
in a persistent vegetative state (PVS), a fetus and an ape.
There are reasonable people who would put PVS patients,
late-term fetuses and apes clearly on one side or the other
of the fuzzy divide. Corresponding to this lack of consensus
on the classification of various entities as persons is the definitional problem on which we focused in the first part of
our article, namely the lack of consensus or obvious correct
choice concerning which traits (psychological or neurological) determine personhood.
Whereas some of the commentators found the undefinability of personhood so obvious as to be trivial (though
they all put it more nicely than that), we note that some of
the greatest minds in the history of philosophy and bioethics
have sought to define personhood. Furthermore, other commentators seemed to hold out hope for a definition, and indeed some even took a crack at it. For example, Grey, Hall
and Carter assert that the psychological characterization of
being “rational and self-aware . . . conscious of themselves
as agents with a history and the capacity to shape their
own future” (2007, 57) is sufficient for personhood. Glannon states that persons are generally taken to be “beings
with the capacity for consciousness, the capacity to interact with others, and to conform to social norms when we
act” (2007, 57), and adds that neuroscience shows us that
“persons are just sets of biological properties generated and
sustained by cortical and subcortical structures in the brain”
(57). Although these proposals seem like good beginnings,
the challenge is to make them specific enough to capture our
intuitions about which entities are and are not persons (or for
fuzzy boundary lovers, our intuitions about degrees of personhood). For example, without substantial further revision
the proposals above would arguably confer personhood on
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certain animals and deny it to humans with certain neuropsychiatric conditions. In sum, the claim that personhood
has yet to be defined, in either a categorical or graded manner, seems to have struck some as obvious but seems not to
have been accepted by others.
In any case, our argument concerning the illusory nature of personhood does not rest on these definitional problems per se. We offered the failures of previous attempts
to define or naturalize personhood as a reason to ask ourselves, “should we be assuming that persons really are in
the world, and that by studying the world we can determine which entities are persons and which are not?” As just
noted, many good minds have assumed this. What we take
from the failure of these programs is not that there are no
persons—clearly a non sequitur—but that it is worth considering other reasons for having the intuition of persons other than
their actual existence as a natural kind in the world. A proposal
for one such reason is the second part of our argument.
The second part of our argument concerns the source of
our intuitions about personhood. Given that defining criteria, even of a graded kind, have yet to be identified for the
concept “person,” it is worth inquiring why we have such a
strong intuition that the world contains the category persons
of course it is possible that our intuitions do reflect empirical generalizations from experience with a world containing
persons and non-persons, and that our attempts to characterize personhood explicitly have simply not yet hit on the
key traits that correlate with personhood. As stated earlier,
our argument is not that the absence of a definition alone
implies that personhood is an illusion. However, given the
state of play in the attempt to define personhood, it worth
asking where else our vivid intuitions that there are persons
might have come from.
As it turns out there is evidence from neuroscience and
developmental psychology that these intuitions may come
from innate brain mechanisms, separate from those used
to learn about other concepts. Whereas the mental categories
day and night, mountain and molehill are learned primarily by
induction from experience with the world, we come into the world
equipped with the tendency to categorize certain entities as persons
and to treat them accordingly. Things with such trigger features
as humanlike faces and/or contingent movement and/or
natural language will tend to elicit from us the “intentional
stance” (the assumption that the entity is acting according
to its own beliefs and desires; Dennett 1978) and a certain
moral regard.
Although some commentators questioned our use of
the term “illusion” in connection with personhood (Banja
2007; Nelson 2007; Roskies 2007), we stand by it in the
sense that the presence of trigger features can cause a
host of psychological and moral traits to be projected onto
objects in the world, quite independently of what our
reason tells us. For example, recall that the presence of
eyes on a computer screen increases the generosity with
which people play a computer game (Farah and Heberlein
2007, 37). Have a look at videos of the robot Kismet
(http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/sociable/videos.html)
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and see how hard it us to view the robot as merely a mobile
metallic object. This is why we say that personhood is an
illusion; just as knowledge of the real nature of a visual
stimulus does not vanquish a visual illusion—the moon
still looks bigger at the horizon and the intersections of the
Herring grid still look dark, even after we have been taught
about these illusions—so the knowledge that the eyes on
the computer are just paper decals and the knowledge
that Kismet is a piece of machinery fail to vanquish our
person-related responses to these objects. Kismet still seems
sentient and it would feel a bit distressing to smash it with
a baseball bat.
Some commentators attempt to justify retaining the concept of a person while acknowledging both the definitional
difficulties and the evidence that our thinking about persons
is influenced by innate systems rather than induced from experience with the world. The boldest attempts along these
lines were by Buford and Allhoff (2007) and by Meghani
(2007), who in different words made the point that just because (a) we haven’t been able to identify so far the correlates of a concept in the natural world, and (b) we have
innate mechanisms causing us to project that concept onto
the world, it does not follow that (c) the concept does not
exist in the world. This argument is logically correct but, if
we understand it, silly. It seems analogous to the following:
If we are watching a movie in Philadelphia, where (a) we
have been unable to ascertain that Angelina Jolie and Brad
Pitt are in town and (b) we know there is a projector in the
theater showing a film starring these actors, nevertheless (c)
we cannot rule out that the figures we see at the front of the
theater are actually Angelina and Brad acting their movie
roles in person in front of the screen.
Roskies’ (2007) attempt to rescue personhood reframes
our argument in terms of two systems for thinking about
persons, one of which is innate and responsible for the illusory aspects of personhood, and the other of which is more
objective (based on psychological traits such as rationality,
communication, etc). She suggests we may have gone overboard by calling personhood an illusion; it would be more
accurate to say that persons are real but we are prone to
misjudgments about them because of that first system. A
different point, suggested by Nelson, is that many entities
are paradigm instances of persons and that the concept of
person works for these, even if it needs clarification for more
debatable instances.
The problem with these approaches comes when we try
to separate the two versions proposed by each commentator, let us call them “intuitive” and “objective” for Roskies
(2007) and “paradigm” and “hard” cases for Nelson (2007).
In the first case, the two versions may not be so easily disentangled. The concept “person” comes with heavy baggage
from our intuitive ways of responding to humans and other
entities, and it is unclear whether we can free ourselves of
the grip of, say, faces when we deliberate about the objective status of a candidate person. For this reason, we advocate focusing on the psychological traits themselves rather
than a concept of person defined by those traits (and as yet
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unsatisfactorily defined). In response to Nelson’s proposal,
separating the two versions is easy enough to do but seems
to accomplish little. What work would the concept of “person” be doing beyond being a new synonym for “normal
adult human” (see also Blackford 2007)? It makes sense to
talk about “persons” rather than “normal adult humans”
only if some broader set of instances is encompassed, with
at least some of the “hard cases.” Indeed, much of the motivation for using the concept “person” comes from our sense
that certain moral generalizations extend beyond the narrow set of normal adult humans.
One aspect of our position that may need additional
clarification is the role of neuroscience in our argument. Although the evidence for the activity of a personhood network comes mainly from neuroscience, in principle neuroscience is no more relevant than psychology, from which
we also drew support in our paper. We are not making
any claims regarding the unique ability of neuroscience to
adjudicate questions of personhood (Buford and Allhoff
2007; Racine 2007). But insofar as neuroscience does contribute informative data, we gratefully acknowledge the
friendly amendments to our description of the person network (Phelps 2007).
The relation between empirical facts and moral theory
was emphasized by several of the commentators, some of
whom distinguished the metaphysical and empirical senses
of personhood (Buford and Allhoff 2007; Nelson 2007; Meyers 2007; Racine 2007; Sagoff 2007). A variant of this point
was the distinction between socially defined and empirical
concepts (Banja 2007; Perring 2007). Of course, the whole
program of naturalizing philosophical concepts, advocated
by far better philosophers than we, involves collapsing or
at least aligning such distinctions in the sense of finding the
empirical correlates of metaphysical or moral concepts.
By now we hope it is clear that we are not advocating a
naturalized conception of personhood. What we are doing is
addressing the relation between the moral concept of a person and the natural world, and in that sense we are assuming
that the natural world is relevant to moral theory. Although
moral principles themselves may not require empirical validation,
they do refer to entities in the real world, and for bioethics in
particular the way in which we anchor such principles in empirical reality is crucial. One of Blackford’s (2007) points about
Lockean personhood is an example of a statement about the
relation between the metaphysical realm of ethics and the
real world: He pointed out that although Locke’s definition
of personhood is perfectly explicit and non-arbitrary, it is not
sufficient to guide practical ethics because entities that are
non-persons on Locke’s view still deserve moral protection.
Given the dim prospects for clarifying the concept of
a person, we suggest dispensing with that concept and instead basing our moral judgments on the interests of entities
with varying levels of awareness, including self-awareness.
Some commentators felt that this approach would end up
encountering the same problems, because then we would
need to determine whose interests should we care about
(Glannon 2007; Grey, Hall and Carter 2007; Meghani 2007;
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Perring 2007). As strange as it sounds to say that consciousness might be the easier of two things to assess, we believe
that is. Compared to personhood, there is less doubt that it
exists, and greater agreement as to the ranking of different
entities. We take Fins’ (2007) commentary to be consistent
with this position. Rather than worry about whether a PVS
patient is a person or not, we should focus on determining
the level of awareness of such patients, many of whom languish in long-term care facilities with attention paid only to
their physical needs.
Centuries of intellectual effort have gone into the explication of personhood. It is therefore quite a challenge to say
something useful and new that might have escaped so many
greater minds than ours. Our target article is no more than
the beginning of an argument, suggested by scientific evidence not available to previous generations. We are grateful
to the fifteen commentators for helping us to hone that argument by highlighting those aspects in need of clarification,
revision, and further evidence.
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